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Abstract
This paper investigates how aspects of policy networks facilitate or inhibit the efforts of
public bureaucracies to adopt and implement science policy innovations. Three correlated
dimensions of policy networks – permeability, size, and tie strength – strongly influence
adoption and implementation outcomes. Policy networks tend to expand and contract cyclically
along these network dimensions.
Policy adoption and implementation are not binary variables, but rather continually
occurring processes that also cycle. Successful adoption and implementation outcomes are most
likely when adoption-implementation and network expansion-contraction cycles are aligned such
that adoption occurs when the policy network is more permeable, larger, and more laden with
weaker ties, and implementation occurs when the network is less permeable, smaller, and more
laden with stronger ties. When cycles are not optimally aligned, adoption and implementation
efforts are more likely to fail or stall.
These arguments draw on literature concerning policy networks as well as collective
action and social capital. They are illustrated with case sketches that describe the attempts by
environmental bureaucrats in six U.S. Mid-Atlantic states to adopt and implement a type of
science policy innovation for wetland management. The sketches draw upon more than 90
interviews with environmental bureaucrats and stakeholders in the region, as well as secondarysource analysis and survey research.
1.0 Introduction
This paper investigates how policy networks facilitate or inhibit the efforts of public
bureaucracies to adopt and implement science policy innovations. Lubell and Fulton (2007);
Balla (2001); True and Mintrom (2001), Young, Charns, and Shortell (2001); Mintrom and
Vergari (1998); Lawton and Wholey (1993) and others suggest that such networks facilitate
policy adoption. Pederson (2010), Tantivess and Walt (2008), Greenaway, Salter, and Hart
(2007), Morris (2004), Hanf and O’Toole (1992) and others argue that they facilitate policy
implementation. Nonetheless, how and why these networks facilitate these policy outcomes still
requires greater exploration. This exploration should be grounded in theory and should provide
tangible value to policy actors. This paper embarks on that theoretical grounding.
Section 1 presents the paper’s propositions. Section 2 is devoted to theory. Section 3
describes data collection and use. Section 4 presents case sketches. Section 5 discusses topics for
future inquiry. Section 6 concludes.
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1.1 Propositions
1.1A) When state bureaucrats have more numerous, weaker, and more permeable ties with
critical actors, adoption of a science policy innovation is more likely.
1.1B) When state bureaucrats have fewer, stronger, and less permeable ties with critical actors,
implementation of a science policy innovation is more likely.
1.1C) When network expansion-contraction and adoption-implementation cycles are (not)
optimally aligned, adoption and implementation efforts are more likely to succeed (fail or stall).
2.0 Theory
2.1 Definitions
The types of public bureaucracies this paper discusses are state governmental agencies
tasked with regulating activities affecting the environment. A state bureaucrat is an individual
employed by such a public bureaucracy.
A science policy innovation is a policy affecting issues typically studied by scholars in
the non-social sciences, e.g., chemistry or biology. The policy is new to the public bureaucracy
adopting or implementing it, though it may have been adopted or implemented elsewhere
(Walker 1969). A science policy innovation frequently is technically or scientifically complex.
Policy actions concerning it frequently require application of technical or scientific expertise and
data. The paper specifically examines rapid wetland assessment tools, products which state
environmental bureaucrats can use to evaluate the functions and services wetlands provide.
Critical actors include scientists with expertise relevant to the science policy innovation,
regional and national policy experts, and bureaucrats in other states. The boundaries delineating
who is a critical actor are explained below.
A policy network is made up of at least two nodes, linkages, and a setting variable. While
in theory nodes can be individuals, organizations, or any other type of entity, in this paper they
are people and are usually referenced as “network members.”
Policy network linkages are conduits for dependency relationships through which nodes
exchange information, resources, or other goods (Benson 1982). Linkages tend to be stable and
nonhierarchical (Borzel 1998). Networks form and persist because they are the most efficient,
least risky, or least costly mechanisms available to help nodes to meet their needs (van Waarden
1992).
The setting variable is a substantive policy issue that both affects and is affected by the
activities of the network (Borzel 1998). Policy networks develop among nodes with expert
knowledge in the issue area and also often foster such knowledge. In this paper, the setting
variable is rapid wetland assessment tool adoption and implementation.
Network permeability is the ease with which a node can move in or out of the network.
An entirely impermeable network would have compulsory and restricted membership. A highly
permeable network would be characterized by entirely voluntary participation and no
membership conditions (van Waarden 1992). Network permeability can refer to the network’s
resistance to or acceptance of new ideas as well as new individuals (Carolan 2007).
The boundaries of a network, and thus its size, are determined by members’ perceptions;
this is the “realist” approach to boundary drawing (Knoke and Yang 2008). Actors clearly

Arnold

4th Annual Conference on Political Networks

3

enmeshed in the policy network, in this case state wetland bureaucrats, are asked about their
connections to other actors relevant to the substantive issue area. Someone is included the
network when those core actors find that person’s inclusion reasonable (ibid.). The critical
actors noted above are people included within the network boundaries but who are not state
bureaucrats.
“The strength of a tie is a (probably linear) combination of the amount of time, the
emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which
characterize the tie” (Granovetter 1973, 1316, emphasis added). Stronger ties tend to occur when
linked actors spend more time with one another and share similar personal characteristics (ibid.).
Implementation of a science policy innovation is the innovation’s usage by state
bureaucrats. Implementation is a continuous variable which can take values from 0, indicating no
usage by anyone in a state bureaucracy, to 1, indicating usage by all bureaucrats in every
situation to which the innovation is applicable. At intermediate values, only some bureaucrats
might use the innovation, bureaucrats might use the innovation for some applications but not
others, or bureaucrats might only use portions of the innovation.
Implementation is an ongoing process. It begins when the first bureaucrat deploys the
policy innovation, continues as the innovation experiences wider use, and reaches an apex where
the innovation is wholly implemented by all relevant staff. Reaching this apex is not inevitable.
Implementation may falter or decline at any point.
Like implementation, adoption is not a binary variable, but rather a continuous one
bounded by 0 and -1.2 Adoption begins when a state bureaucrat who has learned of a potentially
relevant innovation takes an initial step toward potential, eventual implementation of that
innovation by his or her state agency. The adoption process includes the range of preparatory
activities that lead from that first step to the first actual usage of the innovation, i.e., to the start
of implementation. A bureaucracy where no one has taken that first step takes a 0 on the
adoption variable, a state where an innovation has seen its first usage takes a -1 (at this junction,
adoption and implementation share a maximum and minimum), and at intermediate values, state
bureaucrats have made varying degrees of progress towards implementation. The adoption path
is neither inevitable nor necessarily smooth.
2.1 How bureaucrats use policy networks in adoption and implementation of science policy
innovations
Bureaucrats can obtain resources or information from policy networks. This paper is
mainly concerned with information and secondarily with human and political resources, viewing
the latter primarily as the vehicles by which information is conveyed. Bureaucrats turn to other
bureaucrats, scientists, and experts in the private and public sectors for policy-relevant
information because, in today’s world of fast-paced information flows, bureaucracies rarely can
generate independently all the information they need to make policy choices (Goldsmith and
Eggers 2004). Bureaucrats rely on networks for data to inform science-based policies (Kerwin
1994, May 1992) and for political and strategic information they could deploy to professional or
personal advantage (Meier and Bohte 2007). Bureaucrats may use networks to find out how
other government entities are behaving vis-à-vis various issues and thereby gain transferrable
lessons (Heichel 2005, Mintrom 1997, Bennett and Howlett 1992). Bureaucrats may achieve
policy goals by fostering supportive contacts and coalitions outside their agency (O’Leary 2004).
2

The negative sign is required by the setup of the graphs used to illustrate the propositions, but has no other
substantive meaning.
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2.2 Policy network size, tie strength, and permeability are (imperfectly) correlated
A larger network usually has attenuated ties. As a group grows in size, members have
more difficulty monitoring others’ behavior (Olson 1965). Even in active networks where
interactions are frequent, increasing network size increases the number of engagement options
available to any one member and thus may reduce the frequency with which any two members
interact.
When members have fewer repeated interactions, they may perceive the network as less
cohesive and their connections to the network, and it to them, less consequential. They may be
less interested in or able to learn the logics of appropriateness (March and Olsen 2004) and
shared norms and beliefs that might otherwise guide their behavior as network members. Intermember linkages in a larger network generally will be weaker than ties in a smaller network.
A large network reached its size by accepting members; at least at some point, it was
relatively permeable. Permeability facilitates the introduction into the network of new
perspectives from new members. Indeed, Reagans and McEvily (2003) show that members of
networks with larger ranges, a concept closely related to network size, tend to be better at
obtaining and transferring complex ideas. These new insights can further weaken network ties by
revealing potentially divisive dissimilarities among members (see Heider 1958). Weak ties
further encourage permeability of actors and ideas. Whereas members of tight-knit, highly
internally socialized networks may share cognitive filters which screen out information that
contradicts dominant policy narratives (Sabatier and Weible 2007), members of more permeable
networks may have fewer such compunctions. In summary, larger networks appear likely to be
relatively permeable and characterized by weak ties.
A smaller network’s members are likely to interact with the same members more
frequently than in a larger network. Iterated interactions create common expectations about how
people will behave and the norms to which they adhere (Ferejohn 2003, Elster 1986). Coleman
(1988) described networks which foster shared norms as achieving “closure,” noting that these
tend to be strong-tie networks. Intuitively, networks composed primarily of strong ties are likely
to be smaller than those composed of weak ties because the investments of time and human
capital required to forge strong ties often prevents actors from establishing as many such
relationships.
Pinto (2006) argues that a low-permeability network is usually composed of strong ties,
whereas a high-permeability network is more likely to have weaker ties. A network that is more
permeable may have a membership characterized by shorter rather than longer tenures and
greater tenure heterogeneity. Brown (2006) links time individuals spend within an organization
to their development of collective identities that begin to meld members’ narratives and
worldviews. Individuals must spend time together to begin to perceive the logics of
appropriateness and norms that apply to their actions as members of the group (March and Olsen
2004, van Maanen and Schein 1977). A low-permeability network thus is likely to be cohesive
with strong ties, and stronger-tie networks appear more likely to be small than large.
The correlations between network size, strength of ties, and permeability are imperfect. A
large network can be relatively impermeable if its membership rarely changes and its substantive
focus is narrow and static. A small network can have weak ties if members interact infrequently,
while a large network can have strong ties if its members interact quite frequently. This paper’s
argument simply is that the correlations described above are more likely than other combinations
of permeability, size, and tie strength.
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Other variables, such as time, can affect correlation strength and direction. For example,
the argument that a large network must be permeable because it accepted many members is most
tenable if the network just formed and added those individuals. If the network is mature, its
current level of permeability may be different than its initial level. Similarly, arguing that
heterogeneity among network members creates weak ties is most tenable if the network is new
and members have just discovered the dissimilarities that make close relationships appear
implausible. If members have worked in the same policy arena for a long time, their
dissimilarities may become less important than shared norms fostered during their iterated
interactions.
This paper assumes that the networks it describes can be observed from formation
onwards, and that none are too temporally distant from that point. For states considering
adopting and implementing wetland assessment tools, this assumption is plausible. Few states
began to consider using such tools until the mid-1990s (Poeske 2010); policy networks
concerned with wetland assessment and centered around state bureaucrats often can be traced to
that era. However, the impact of time on this paper’s propositions must be explored further.
2.3 Policy networks experience cycles of greater or lesser permeability and tie strength and
smaller and larger size
A policy network may start out small and grow larger as members work to bring more
people with more relevant expertise into the group. Or, people might push their way into the
network upon realizing its existence and its relevance to them, as members of a neighborhood
affected by a toxic substances leak might insist on being represented at relevant governmental
discussions. Once the leak is addressed, however, the network may shrink as community
stakeholders leave. A network of individuals who pick up litter in a community park may begin
as a loose collectivity of occasional volunteers; those weak ties might grow strong if a tornado
wreaks havoc on the town and the group pulls together to rehabilitate area green spaces. Network
permeability, size, and tie strength are not constant. The variables change through two main
mechanisms.
First, the settings of these variables may be manipulated by policy entrepreneurs or
stakeholders. Policy entrepreneurs advantageously couple politics, policies, and problems to
effect political change (Kingdon 1984). Entrepreneurs can negotiate between policy coalitions
with competing preferences (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999; Sabatier and Weible 2007). A
policy entrepreneur acts on behalf of some organization or public, inchoate or not, and receives
some benefit in return; the benefit is likely intangible rather than monetary (Kuhnert 2001).
Knoke and Yang (1996) called for more research into the ways policy entrepreneurs can
exert strategic influence in policy networks. Mintrom and Vergari (1998) find that when policy
entrepreneurs leverage their involvement in networks, they are more likely to accomplish their
goals of legislative reform. Greenaway, Salter, and Hart (2007) show that policy entrepreneurs
involved in hospital siting decision can manipulate the nature and foci of implementation
networks. Christopoulos (2006, 757) even argues that networks “provide the context within
which these actors thrive” and that “political entrepreneurs are network-dependent [which]
implies that their ability for political action is network-contingent.”
A stakeholder is a particular type of policy entrepreneur. The stakeholder often is not
involved in the policy network because of an intentional, professional interest. Rather, he found
himself affected by the substantive activities of the network and wanted to participate in the
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choices impacting him. He can push and pull at the network’s setting variables in the same way
as a policy entrepreneur, but his motivations and perspectives often are different.
The second way in which network variable settings can be changed is through the
influence of events beyond the scope of the network. In Ostrom’s (2005) Institutional Analysis
and Design (IAD) framework, events occurring in the action situation – the focal unit of the
analysis, and in this case, the arena wherein the policy network is operating – are affected by
larger forces: attributes of the physical world, the community context, and rules and institutional
arrangements. These forces clearly can affect a policy network focused on a science policy
innovation. If the relevant science changes (attribute of the physical world), this will affect the
nature and activities of the network. If the innovation is adopted or implemented by other states
(community context), this action and its outcomes will impact the policy network. If the state
legislature passes a new law in the network’s substantive area (rule/institutional arrangement),
the network may become very active because there will be demand for science policy
innovations to help implement legislation.
The ways in which policy network size, permeability, and tie strength change due to
manipulation or external forces can be described visually:
Figure 1

A network does not always expand (increasing in size and permeability and ties
weakening due to attenuation), reach an apex, and then contract (decreasing in size and
permeability, with ties growing stronger) or vice-versa. These cycles are not inevitable.
However, when external forces or internal manipulators try to create change in a policy network,
these are the paths along which those modifications frequently occur.
2.3 Adoption and implementation processes experience similar cycles
The adaptive management literature assumes that adoption and implementation are
cyclically linked. In the classic model, a policy is adopted and then implemented. Its results are
assessed and the policy is revised based on lessons learned. The revised policy is then adopted
and implemented, its results are assessed, and the process iterates (Lee 1999, McLain and Lee
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1996). Weimer and Vining’s (2005) claim that policy implementation can be understood as a
series of adoptions is consistent with this perspective, as is the argument of this paper that both
adoption and implementation are continuous variables representing processes. The cyclical
nature of adoption and implementation can be described visually:3
Figure 2

Adoption and implementation processes do not spontaneously flow from one parabola to
the other. A state bureaucracy may move along these curves via manipulation by policy
entrepreneurs, who may be bureaucrats or stakeholders. Literature supports the argument that
such entrepreneurs facilitate policy adoption (e.g., Hays and Glick 1997, Mintrom 1997, Balla
2001, Shipan and Volden 2006) and implementation (e.g., Bardach 1977; Levin and Ferman
1986; Nakamura, Church, and Cooper 1991; Oliver and Paul-Sheehan 1997). Or, a bureaucracy
may be propelled along the curves by external forces that can be captured by Ostrom’s three
categories. For example, if the community in which a bureaucracy seeks to implement a science
policy innovation is skeptical of it (community context), implementation may stall. If an event in
the biophysical world makes the science policy innovation immediately necessary (such as a
flood making more vital a wetland assessment tool that could evaluate wetland flood storage),
the bureaucracy likely will be spurred along the adoption path. If local zoning boards adopt
ordinances (rules/institutional arrangements) that call for use of an innovation that is different
from the one the bureaucracy was in the process of adopting, adoption may stall or be delayed.
2.4 Larger, more permeable, and weaker-tie networks facilitate adoption
Weak ties can serve as bridges among dissimilar individuals (Granovetter 1973, Burt
2001). Because of their diversity, these individuals are likely to bring a wider variety of
resources and perspectives to the action situation than a group of more similar individuals. Policy
adoption frequently requires coalition building (Burstein 1991) that weak ties facilitate.
The likelihood that an innovation will be adopted is in part a function of resources
available to help those pushing the innovation overcome obstacles (Mohr 1969). A large policy
3

The captions in Figure 2 refer to a rapid wetland assessment tool specifically but can describe a science policy
innovation generally.
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network has a large number of members who can bring information and resources to the task of
surmounting organizational inertia and overcoming adoption-related resistance that may exist
inside and outside the bureaucracy.
Relatedly, larger networks may be better than smaller networks at searching out
adoption-facilitative information. Oliver and Marwell (1988) theorize that, although collective
action (such as the acquisition of information that would help improve a science policy
innovation and pave the way for implementation) is generally considered more difficult with
larger groups, when the costs of a collective good such as information are relatively invariant,
larger groups should be more successful in its acquisition because they “have more resources and
are more likely to have a critical mass of highly interested and resourceful actors” (ibid.,1). And,
indeed, the costs of seeking relevant information do not grow with network size. The amount of
potentially relevant information available in the external world is unaffected by the number of
policy network members looking for it. In fact, search costs actually decline as the network
grows because costs are distributed among more searchers.
Members of a relatively permeable network often have less group cohesion than those in
less permeable ones, thanks to fewer interactions and reduced ability to observe and monitor
others. This disconnect limits Sabatier’s (1978) “devil shift” or Janis’s (1971) “groupthink.”
Both are phenomena that cause tight-knit groups to close ranks on ideas and discount or reject
potentially more useful ones simply because they are different or not supplied by group
members. Thus, a more permeable network more easily accepts new perspectives. Those new
insights are valuable when bureaucrats are considering which science policy innovation to adopt
and how to tailor an innovation to the state’s needs; making smart choices about a relatively
unknown quantity often requires previously unknown data.
2.5 Smaller, less permeable, and stronger-tie networks facilitate implementation
A network with fewer members can focus on pushing implementation forward because,
relative to a larger network, its members have to spend less energy and resources managing intragroup coalitions and competing interests. Even if not all members of the network agree that on
the advisability of implementing the innovation, when the network is smaller there will be fewer
members whose disagreements could stall implementation. Changing the preferences and
patterns of interactions among policy-relevant actors is one of the biggest challenges of policy
implementation (Crosby 1996); networks which can do this more easily are more likely to
experience successful implementation outcomes.
Because smaller, less permeable networks have more opportunity to build group
cohesion, their members may be affected by Sabatier’s “devil shift” or Janis’s “groupthink.”
Members are more likely to close ranks on the innovation that has been adopted, devoting
themselves to its success and discounting information that might distract them. This narrow
focus is a double-edged sword, however. It might do a disservice to the innovation itself, since a
relatively blinkered group of adherents could ignore data pointing to better innovations or more
productive implementation modes. To the extent that flaws in the adopted innovation are not
apparent or sufficiently salient to members of the policy network, and yet are fundamental
enough to cause implementation problems, a smaller, more cohesive network could be a liability
instead of an asset. It is likely there is some ceiling on the amount of network member buy-in
that is facilitative.
Networks with strong ties that build cooperation and trust accumulate “bonding” social
capital, in contrast to the “bridging” social capital associated with weak ties (Gittell and Vidal
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1998). Bonding social capital strengthens existing in-network relationships. Intensification of
these linkages is important because it fortifies members to face an implementation process
inevitably fraught with challenges (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973).
2.6 The Goldilocks dilemma
In an ideal world, a policy network best positioned to facilitate adoption of a science
policy innovation would have ties weak enough to facilitate the formation of bridging social
capital, allowing network members to form vital coalitions and infusing the adoption process
with the diversity of information and resources necessary to select, refine, and tailor a highly
technical science policy innovation, yet not so weak that members’ limited commitment would
lead them to participate in network functions infrequently and fail to bring resources to the
network because its activities would not be sufficiently salient to them. The network would be
large enough to bring in the volume and diversity of information necessary to facilitate adoption
and minimize search costs through distribution, but not so large that members’ sense of
disconnect from the network would cause them to shirk. The network would have enough
permeability to accept the new members and ideas important for refining the innovation in
preparation for adoption, but would not be so permeable that members’ short tenures would
inhibit follow-through or that the quantity and diversity of ideas introduced would be so large as
to overwhelm.
Similarly, a policy network best positioned to facilitate implementation of a science
policy innovation would be small enough to minimize the amount of time network members
spend on intra-group “cat herding,” but not so small that it leaves out individuals with
substantive expertise and interests whose exclusion could cause subsequent implementation
problems in the form of unresolved objections or intransigent preferences and patterns of
interaction. The network would have enough group cohesion to foster buy-in, but not enough to
cause willful blindness. The network would have enough bonding social capital that members
would be confident in and committed to the innovation despite the challenges of implementation,
but not so much that, in the face of such challenges, they would be slavishly inflexible about the
implementation process or even some aspects of the innovation itself.
Identifying one “correct” network size, level of permeability, and strength of ties is
impossible. The optimal values for these variables will depend on characteristics of the
innovation; policy network composition; the relevant organizational, political, and
socioeconomic contexts; the history of the policy network; and other factors. Although it is not
possible to find the point at which each variable’s setting is “just right,” it should be possible to
make predictions about the conditions under which different the configurations might be more or
less facilitative of adoption or implementation (see Ostrom 2007).
2.7 The ideal relationship between network expansion-contraction (EC) and adoptionimplementation (AI) cycles
Figure 3 is a visual depiction of the claims in Sections 2.4 and 2.5 concerning the
network variable settings that facilitate adoption and implementation of a science policy
innovation:
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Figure 3

The blue curve is the parabolas from Figure 1 connected so they intersect the x-axis,
which for this curve represents some baseline levels of the network variables. The gray curve is
the parabolas from Figure 2 connected so they intersect the x-axis, which for the gray curve
represents (from left to right) the zero-point where adoption has not yet been initiated, the point
where adoption is complete and implementation begins, and the point where implementation
stops and the stage is set for adoption of a new innovation or a revised version of the original
innovation. Adoption is best facilitated when the blue curve is at its maximum and
implementation is best facilitated when the blue curve is at its minimum.
Time on the x-axis suggests that the curves show how quickly or slowly the AI or EC
cycles occur. While the curves in Figure 3 ideal sine waves, in real life the curves may be steeper
or flatter and are unlikely to be symmetric or perfectly 180 degrees of out of phase.
Two y-axes could be added. The first could have units corresponding to the magnitude of
network change; the height of the EC curves then would indicate the degree to which the
correlated network variables moved from some baseline. The y-axis for the AI curves would
mark off intervals between the maximum (1 or -1) and minimum (0) for adoption and
implementation. There may be other conceptual issues associated with adding y-axes; this paper
does not explore them.
Adoption and implementation and network expansion and contraction are conceptualized
as sequential processes, both for the sake of simplicity and because, in the real world, they often
are. However, there is another potentially ideal alignment of AI and EC curves. This scenario
may better approximate reality in some cases, but because it is more complex, it is not
considered beyond its explication here.
The second ideal alignment recognizes that people often multi-task. Policy network
members are simultaneously involved in separate implementation and adoption processes. The
network splits, with a small group devoting itself to implementation while the larger group
focuses on adoption; overlaps in group membership are possible:
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Figure 4

This scenario would occur when policy network members pursue adaptive management
in its ideal form. Preparation for adoption and implementation of the next iteration of a science
policy innovation begins immediately upon implementation of the first iteration. As soon as the
innovation is fully implemented (1.0 on the implementation parabola in Figure 1), network
members can begin to observe and assess the its impacts. The 1.0 value then aligns with the
decision point indicated in the adoption parabola in Figure 2. Network members now can make
an evidence-based choice about the nature of the innovation in the next iteration. The troughs in
Figure 4 are wider and flatter, indicating that at this point of alignment, there is less change in the
extent of implementation, adoption, expansion, or contraction; relevant actors are pausing to see
how implementation plays out and thus what adoption choices should be made. Then, almost as
soon as implementation of the original innovation stops – with another flat portion of the curves
representing potential delays or hitches associated with the change-over – implementation of the
revised version of the innovation can begin. The adoption process delivers the next iteration just
in time.
Section 4 shows how various kinds of alignment failures can cause implementation and
adoption problems. Alignment and misalignment also are critical in this more complex picture.
2.8 Causality
This paper’s propositions assume that network permeability, size, and tie strength are
independent variables that affect the likelihood and nature of adoption and implementation.
However, members of policy networks work with each other over time and on different tasks in
their shared issue area. They may be involved in multiple adoption and implementation efforts.
When interactions are iterated, the outcomes of policy-related choices become the inputs
into new interaction and decision processes (Ostrom 2005). Particularly given the complex,
dynamic nature of the systems explored here, path dependencies – situations where initial
choices have disproportionate influence over options subsequently available to decision-makers,
and the direction and magnitude of outcomes may be unpredictable and not commensurate with
inputs (Pierson 2000) – are likely. Path dependencies could create situations where, in later
iterations, the dependent variables affect the independent variables. For example, a policy
network may be small because its membership consolidated to facilitate implementation.

Arnold

4th Annual Conference on Political Networks

12

However, when that network next wants to adopt an innovation, it will be challenged by its lack
of members. The implementation experience at time one affects network size at time two. Thus,
the relationships described here are most realistically understood as correlations.
3.0 Methods
The goals of the empirical portion of this inquiry are to:
1) Describe the rapid wetland assessment tool adoption and implementation processes that have
occurred in Mid-Atlantic states since 1995;
2) Quantify the size, permeability, and strength of ties in the wetland assessment policy networks
that existed when the adoption and implementation processes were occurring; and
3) Trace the adoption-implementation and network expansion-contraction cycles and evaluate
the extent to which they correspond with the theoretical propositions in Section 1.1.
3.1 Data collection
3.11 Interviews
More than 90 individuals in six states – Delaware, Maryland, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Virginia, and West Virginia – were interviewed between September 2010 and April 2011
concerning adoption and implementation of rapid wetland assessment tools for regulatory
purposes in the states. The interviewees were state bureaucrats directly involved in wetland
regulation; federal wetland regulators from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; state, regional, and national wetland scientists and policy
experts; and environmental consultants who regularly worked in the six states.
Interviewees were initially selected because of their membership in an EPA-funded
regional workgroup devoted to advancing the science and policy of wetland assessment; because
their names were located on current and past state bureaucracy organizational charts, guidance
documents, permit files, published versions of rapid wetland assessment tools, and other
secondary sources; or because they were recommended by EPA wetland regulators. Subsequent
interviewees were selected because they were mentioned by initial interviewees.
The interviews were semi-structured. One line of questioning inquired about the
interviewee’s network ties. State bureaucrats were asked about who they relied upon for
assistance or advice when implementing a rapid wetland assessment tool or during the adoption
process. They were specifically asked about their relationships with academics, members of the
regional wetland workgroup, and other policy experts. Scientists and policy experts, federal
regulators, and consultants were asked about the nature of their relationships with state wetland
bureaucrats. Federal regulators also were asked how they would describe the bureaucrats’
relationships with other sources of wetland assessment expertise. Consultants were asked about
their overall perceptions of the functioning of the state wetland bureaucracy, especially in
comparison to other states in which the consultants had worked. As of May 31, all but eight
interviews were transcribed, but only one was coded.
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3.12 Surveys
Two mixed-method surveys were launched between February and May 2011. The first
survey was administered to a sample of individuals whose names have been associated, in
published reports or anecdotal references, with tools whose use was reported in any of the states.
These were individuals who, if state bureaucrats communicated with them, likely were members
of those bureaucrats’ wetland assessment policy networks. The sampling strategy was exhaustive
in its aim rather than based on probability.
The goal of this survey was to explore the relationships between this group of potential
critical actors and the state bureaucrats who may or may not have adopted and implemented their
tools. Eligible respondents were asked multiple choice questions about how frequently they
initiated contact with state bureaucrats to provide tool adoption or implementation assistance and
how frequently state bureaucrats initiated communication with them. Respondents were asked
about what they generally discussed when they communicated with state bureaucrats. Finally,
respondents were asked multiple choice questions about how helpful bureaucrats in each state
seemed to have found the respondent’s tool.
Sample members were invited to the online survey via email or postal mail. Email
addresses were obtained from online or print secondary sources. Postal mailing addresses were
obtained using free and fee online people search engines. Sample members had approximately
1.5 months to complete the survey. Members contacted via email received two reminders, while
members contacted via postal mail received one. The sample frame contained some individuals
to whom the survey did not apply (for example, a postal recipient who had the same name as an
assessment tool developer). The first question in the survey screened out ineligible individuals.
At the end of the survey, respondents were asked to indicate the names of other assessment tool
developers to whom the survey would apply. This question allowed a second round of email and
mail surveying.
The survey cooperation rate, calculated using as the denominator an estimate of “the
proportion of all cases interviewed of all eligible units ever contacted” (AAPOR 2011, 6), was
52.13%. This value is an estimate because the proportional allocation method (Smith 2009), the
strategy for estimating unknown eligibility used by the American Association for Public Opinion
Research’s online response rate calculator, was used to approximate the number of ineligible cases
among non-respondents. This estimation procedure was selected because it tends to be conservative
(Smith 2009). The data from the first survey have not been analyzed further.
The second survey was administered via email and postal mail to individuals in the six states.
The sample aimed to include all current or former state employees who at some point since 1995
worked in divisions or departments that engaged in wetland assessment for regulatory purposes.
The survey asked respondents to indicate up to four individuals upon whom they relied
the most, in their professional capacity, for advice about wetland regulatory matters at some
point since 1995. This is an approach commonly used in social science network research
(Carrington, Scott, and Wasserman 2005). The respondent is the “ego” and each contact she
reports is an “alter.”
Egos were asked about the duration of their relationships with each alter. The duration
questions were intended to access a dimension of network permeability; if relationships were
generally long-lasting, the network may be relatively impermeable, and vice-versa. Egos also
responded to multiple choice questions about nature of their relationships with each alter and the
frequency of the interactions, measures intended to access tie strength.
Names of potential respondents were collected from secondary sources such as old permit
files, regulatory letters, resource monitoring reports, and staff directories. EPA wetland
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regulators and current state employees contacted for interviews also provided contacts. Email
addresses were obtained when possible from online and print sources. Postal addresses were
located using the process described for the first survey. Postal recipients were invited to the same
online survey as email recipients. The survey had an initial a screening question meant to ensure
that only individuals who used or could have used rapid wetland assessment tools for a
regulatory purpose were queried. Sample members had approximately one month to complete
the survey. Members contacted via email received two reminders, while members contacted via
postal mail received one. At the time of this writing, the last state survey deadline had just
passed. The data are not yet analyzed.
3.13 Quasi-ethnographic research
Over the periods May-August 2008, 2009, and 2010, the author was a National Network
of Environmental Management Scholars fellow at the EPA regional office responsible for federal
wetland regulatory activities in five of the six states in the sample. From August 2010 through
May 2011, the author was a volunteer at that same office. EPA regional wetland regulators spend
a significant portion of their time working with their state wetland regulatory counterparts.
Working with the EPA staff offered much insight on wetland regulation in the Mid-Atlantic
states and unique access to data.
3.14 Secondary source research
The author was given access by EPA staff to all the documents that the regional
workgroup on wetland science and policy has produced since its inception in the early 2000s and
at least three years’ worth of reports and budgets associated with wetland program development
grants that have flowed from EPA to the Mid-Atlantic states. The author independently gathered
other reports, tool copies, presentations, meeting minutes, and other relevant documents. As of
this writing these data have not been coded.
3.2 Operationalizing key variables
This section describes the how key variables will be constructed for analysis. These
approaches likely will be refined.
Network size will be measured by recording the names of individuals mentioned in
interviews and survey data and noted in secondary sources concerning wetland assessment in a
given state. The number of these individuals will represent network size.
Network permeability will be measured in part by reviewing the lists of member names
and counting the number of members who appear to have entered the network after the 1995
baseline. Entrance into the network will be indicated by the individual’s first appearance in
secondary source or by interviewee comments on the timing of an individual’s network entrance.
To this count will be added the number of individuals who appear to have left the
network. This number is more difficult to estimate from secondary sources because absence of
mention does not definitively indicate that a member has left. Thus, exits from the network will
primarily be gleaned from instances when interviewees mention that someone stopped being
involved in wetland assessment activities. The number of exits and entrances will be added; a
higher score will indicate more permeability.
The permeability score may be adjusted up or down using two multipliers. First, the
average duration of a bureaucrat-critical actor linkage, as indicated by the survey data, will be
calculated and compared to the durations associated with other states in the sample. The duration

Arnold

4th Annual Conference on Political Networks

15

values will be separated into low, medium, and high categories. These values will be assigned
multipliers such that a low value increases the permeability score, a medium value keeps it
constant, and a high value reduces it. Second, the permeability of the network to new ideas will
be categorized as low, medium, or high depending on the author’s qualitative impressions
gleaned from interviews, and the values assigned multipliers that adjust the permeability score.
Tie strength will be measured primarily using survey data. Survey respondents were
asked to use ordinal categories to report the frequency of their interaction with critical actors.
The average proportion of interactions that fell into each category will be calculated for each
network. Bureaucrats were asked to categorize the critical actors to whom they were connected
as professional acquaintances, colleagues, or friends. The average proportion of linkages that fell
into each category will also be calculated for each network. The policy networks will be
compared vis-à-vis their distributions on these variables and ranked according to evidence of tie
strength.
Adoption and implementation will be continuous variables bounded by 0 and +/-1. The
thresholds that will determine the location of a state bureaucracy on the AI curves are
substantive, such as the first instance of tool pilot testing or a specific percentage of state
bureaucrats estimated to be using the tool. In the interest of space, the thresholds are not
described here. Evidence supporting the placement of a state bureaucracy on the AI curves will
come from interviews, survey data, and secondary sources.
4.0 Case Sketches
Since the data remain largely unanalyzed, the vignettes below are not full case studies.
They rely on a limited number of interviews and secondary sources and not at all on the survey
data. They are meant to illustrate how alignment or misalignment of the AI and EC cycles
appears to facilitate or hinder the adoption and implementation of a science policy innovation.
Each sketch is followed by a visual depiction of the dynamics the sketch explored.
4.1 Delaware
Delaware is in the middle stages of adopting a rapid wetland assessment tool for
regulatory purposes, having recently passed the decision point where bureaucrats commit to such
use. In 2009, the watershed assessment section of the Delaware Department of Natural
Resources and Environmental Control secured EPA funds to adapt for regulatory use the rapid
wetland assessment tool that has been used in Delaware for restoration and conservation
purposes since 2001 (Biddle, Jacobs, and Herr 2009).
Unlike in the other states, the policy network surrounding wetland assessment in
Delaware developed around a tool designed, revised, and used over many years for nonregulatory purposes. The Delaware Rapid Assessment Protocol (DERAP) is well known to
wetland assessment experts regionally and nationally. Practically every person interviewed for
this project who was familiar with both wetland assessment and the states in question mentioned
DERAP, usually citing it as an example of a sophisticated, scientifically rigorous tool. One
federal wetland expert said that no study of wetland assessment in the region would be complete
without an examination of Delaware and DERAP, and that Delaware is a “poster child” for
wetland assessment (Rhodes 2010). Aspects of the tool have been recently analyzed or profiled
in national scholarly journals such as Wetlands (Sifneos et al. 2010) and Environmental
Management (Herlihy et al. 2009).
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As DERAP has developed and become nationally known, the bureaucrats responsible for
it have collected a large and diverse (weak tie) network of scientists and policy experts interested
in using, helping refine, or studying the tool. This network was accessible to Delaware’s wetland
bureaucrats as they moved to the adoption decision point and arguably facilitated that movement.
The question now is whether Delaware’s policy network will be able to contract,
becoming stronger and less permeable to facilitate implementation. There is evidence that this
contraction may be delayed because of external influences of the types noted in Sections 2.3 and
2.4. A state wetland bureaucrat who has long been crucial to the assessment effort in Delaware
recently left state government. The reshuffling of this individual’s responsibilities and intraagency regrouping seems to be causing general delays in the state’s wetland regulatory efforts.
For example, a project manager on the grant cited above recently pushed back by multiple
months a check-in meeting with EPA staff, explaining that there was just no time. Also, in the
summer of 2010, DERAP started experiencing heavy and often critical scrutiny by federal
regulators. A developer attempted to use the tool to assess a wetland area in Delaware in
preparation for a controversial project. Federal regulators’ objections to the project seem to have
negatively affected the way some of them perceive the tool. In part because of the
interrelationships between state and federal wetland regulatory processes, it is helpful to state
regulators when federal regulators approve of the former’s work. Delaware’s wetland regulators
thus may be waiting for the DERAP issue to “cool off” before they attempt a push towards
implementation of the tool in regulatory applications.
Figure 5

4.2 Maryland
From 1970 to roughly the early 1990s, Maryland was one of the nation’s leading states
vis-à-vis wetland protection and innovative tools for that purpose (Rhodes 2010); one retired
state regulator stated that Maryland “had one of the most progressive wetland programs in the
world.” The state passed tidal wetland protection legislation in 1970 and a non-tidal wetlands
protection act in 1989 (Gaddie and Regens 2000). Multiple interviewees noted that in the 1970s,
1980s, and early 1990s, Maryland’s wetland regulators, particularly its program leaders, were
well-connected to a variety of national, regional, and local critical contacts. Ties with a highly
supportive governor, for example, facilitated the passage of the non-tidal legislation (ibid.).
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Today, however, Maryland’s policy network devoted to innovations in wetland policy
has changed. Minutes and attendance sheets from the Mid-Atlantic Wetland Work Group
(MAWWG), the regional group devoted to advancing wetland assessment science and policy,
suggest that there has been minimal turnover among the Maryland’s assessment staff since
MAWWG’s inception in the early 2000s. The same individual has been responsible for the
regulatory wetland assessment effort in the state since the mid-1990s; one interviewee said that
this individual has “been there since the beginning of time.” The policy network’s current small
size appears the result of a persistent failure to bridge a major structural hole, suggesting a
dominance of bonding over bridging social capital and also limited permeability. More than one
interviewee reported a history of non-cooperation between the state’s regulatory environmental
agency and its natural resource management agency. While both agencies pursue wetland-related
activities, they pursue them largely in separate spheres.
The number of state staffers involved in regulatory-targeted wetland assessment in
Maryland appears small relative to the number in the other states. One EPA expert called the
state’s assessment program fairly “insulated.” Unlike in a state such as Ohio, where the statespecific technical workgroup devoted to assessment involved a variety of actors with different
affiliations, Maryland’s wetland assessment workgroup is almost entirely composed staff from
state agencies (ELI 2008). When state bureaucrats tapped a public sector environmental think
tank to help strategize about wetland assessment tool development, the expert with whom state
staffers worked most closely was regarded by some EPA experts as “behind the times.”
It appears that, over time, Maryland’s policy network associated with innovations in
wetland management shrank, becoming more ossified and less permeable. While this contraction
probably facilitated the implementation of wetland innovations adopted in the 1970s and 1980s,
it left Maryland less able to adopt new wetland innovations. Today, Maryland has begun the tool
adoption process, but only barely.
In the mid-1990s the state failed in a major bid to adopt a high-profile wetland policy
innovation: state assumption of the federal wetland permitting program (Gaddie and Regens
2000). Since then, Maryland has appeared largely to be “resting on its laurels” instead of keeping
up with the latest wetland policy innovations (Rhodes 2010). Maryland’s current assessment
program has been described by some regional experts as “dead in the water” and “a fairly tragic
story.” Since the early 2000s, the state has received EPA funds to develop a rapid wetland
assessment tool. It has used these funds to develop a series of monitoring plans, convene a state
workgroup on wetland assessment, and commission external research entities to produce papers
on assessment (Clearwater 2010). Maryland remains the only state in the region that has neither
recently developed a rapid wetland assessment tool nor is considering adopting or implementing
a specific one. Some EPA staff members report being frustrated with the way Maryland has used
its grant monies and its lack of assessment tool progress. But Maryland’s limited progress on
adoption or implementation of a rapid wetland assessment tool makes theoretical sense; its
policy network is the opposite of the type of network which appears to facilitate adoption.
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Figure 6

4.3 Ohio
All the states have one or more intra-state technical workgroups devoted to wetland
assessment issues. Members of these groups are almost certainly members of the states’ policy
networks surrounding wetland policy innovation. The Ohio workgroup, formed in the late 1990s,
appears to have been most diverse and perhaps the largest among all the intra-state groups. This
network consisted of roughly 20 people, and it grew out of a larger stakeholder group of 50–80
people (Mack 2010). The Ohio workgroup comprised scientists, members of environmental
advocacy groups, representatives of the regulated community, and state bureaucrats from a
variety of agencies. A scientist led the group’s effort to find a workable assessment approach.
The group extensively reviewed the scientific and gray literatures about assessment around the
country, then decided that rapid wetland assessment tools already in use in two different states,
Minnesota and Washington, would provide the best basis for Ohio’s assessment effort (Fennessy
2010).
Presumably learning about assessment tools around the country, and obtaining
assessment tools from Minnesota and Washington and learning how to use them, required
members of the Ohio policy network to forge ties with bureaucrats and critical actors in other
states. These likely were weak ties, which are best suited for conveying information and less
suited for fostering close personal relationships (Granovetter 1973). Not only was the network
that facilitated tool adoption large and characterized by weak ties, but it also clearly was
permeable to new ideas.
This diverse technical workgroup facilitated the creation of the Ohio Rapid Wetland
Assessment Method (ORAM) in 1998, then helped the state revise the tool five times between
1998 and 2001. Over that time period, the tool actually was being implemented while new
iterations were being developed; this situation most closely parallels the more complex optimal
alignment scenario described by Figure 4. Bureaucrats involved with implementation at that time
report that their interactions with members of the policy network were regular, ongoing, and
relatively intense (Mack 2010). On the other hand, the larger network of critical actors devoted
to adoption was still conferring and drawing on a variety of sources to help improve the tool in
its next iteration (Fennessy 2010). Thus, the small, less permeable, and stronger-tie network
facilitative of implementation coexisted for a time with the larger, more permeable, and weakertie network facilitative of adoption.
ORAM was not revised after 2001. Legislative changes made revisions more difficult,
though not impossible, and most members of the policy network agreed that the tool was in good
shape (Micacchion 2010). The large network devoted to adoption mostly dissipated, leaving a
small cadre of individuals who now do research and analysis in support of the ongoing, complete
integration of ORAM into Ohio’s wetland regulatory program. Today, all state wetland
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regulators must be familiar with ORAM and state wetland permit applicants have strong formal
and informal incentives to use it (Mack 2010). The tool has become fully part of the state’s
wetland regulatory culture (ibid.) and is generally perceived by members of the wetland policy
community as a major assessment success story.
Figure 7

4.4 Pennsylvania
In the mid- to late-1990s, Pennsylvania committed to developing a wetland assessment
tool. It was supported in this effort by the Pennsylvania State Cooperative Wetlands Center, early
participation in MAWWG, and an active intra-state assessment workgroup that brought together
staff from the departments of environmental protection and natural resources, the fish and boat
commission, the state transportation agency, and the game commission, as well as various
members of the public and the private sectors. The Wetlands Protection Advisory Committee
(WETPAC) met every three to four months. Led by a bureaucrat strongly committed to
assessment, the group appeared to have been making good progress toward developing a tool
that ultimately could be implemented. The policy network was relatively large, diverse, and
apparently permeable.
However, larger political trends in the state as well as staffing changes at the
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (PADEP) caused the network to begin to
disintegrate in the early 2000s. Interviewees who used to participate in WETPAC activities said
that meetings just tapered off, and that they stopped being called by PADEP bureaucrats seeking
input about assessment. Importantly, this network disruption occurred before the group had
reached final consensus on the nature of the tool. Adoption was still ostensibly in progress.
Today, the policy network surrounding wetland assessment in Pennsylvania appears to
have shrunk significantly and become less diverse. The relationship between the Pennsylvania
State Wetlands Center and state bureaucrats is no longer as strong or direct (Wardrop 2010). The
leader of the assessment initiative in Pennsylvania now appears to be running it almost
independently. It is not clear whether this individual has sought intra- or inter-agency support
and been denied it, or has simply chosen to go it alone; some interviewees suggest the latter. The
network is also notable for the structural holes it fails to bridge. State bureaucrats’ jobs are
usually much easier when they have a cooperative relationship with U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers district regulators who also pursue wetland regulation in the state. However, one of the
Corps districts that covers a wide swath of Pennsylvania has refused to engage with the state’s
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assessment tool development process, and state bureaucrats involved in the assessment initiative
have reportedly been equally unwilling to “court” that Corps district or any others.
There appears to be increasing skepticism among remaining members of the policy
network concerning whether the state’s assessment tool will ever actually be used in regulatory
applications. Members worry over the conflict with the Corps, the viability of the now-insulated
tool development process, and assessment initiative’s recent history of delays and missed
deadlines. One federal regulator recently worried that “things are going to get ugly” in
Pennsylvania’s assessment attempt fairly soon.
These troubling network trends clearly have affected adoption and implementation
outcomes. Regional experts have described Pennsylvania’s wetland assessment program as
“confusing.” One federal regulator asked this author, only half-jokingly, “when you figure it out,
can you tell us?” A key official in the state’s wetland assessment initiative reported that the state
is planning to integrate its rapid assessment tool into regulatory use in the near future, but federal
officials say that the state has been planning such a roll-out for years and has made little
progress. In fact, a 2008 assay of the state’s wetland programs reported that in 2006 the state had
completed and was field-testing an assessment protocol in preparation for regulatory roll-out
(ELI 2008); this is essentially the same status report that a state bureaucrat provided via
interviewee four years later. Pennsylvania is currently holding trainings to familiarize
stakeholders with the current version of the tool, but state officials have already told participants
that the tool will be revised again before it is actually used.
The larger, more permeable, weaker-tie network that facilitated the early stages of tool
adoption in Pennsylvania seems to have contracted too soon. The network reached potentially
implementation-facilitating conditions while adoption processes still needed to occur. The
associated withdrawal/consolidation of resources (information, human capital) and closing of
ranks (cohesion) on an incomplete tool concept not yet suitable for implementation stalled the AI
cycle before implementation could begin.
Figure 8
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4.5 Virginia
Virginia is unique among the states in the sample in that state environmental agencies are
in some cases legally required to rely on the Virginia Institute of Marine Sciences (VIMS) for
technical advice. The research institute is roughly 60 years old, employs 450 staff with technical
expertise, and has served as an objective scientific advisor to state agencies throughout its history
(Hershner and Havens 2010). Virginia’s non-tidal wetland regulatory program was established in
2001 and its bureaucrats immediately had access to VIMS’ well-established, far-reaching
network of experts interested in science policy innovation.
VIMS staff members appear to have multiple strong ties to wetland policy-interested
researchers, policy experts, and bureaucrats across the region. Virginia wetland bureaucrats also
work with researchers at Virginia Tech and staff at other state agencies, such as the Virginia
Department of Transportation, on wetland assessment issues. State wetland bureaucrats have
participated in MAWWG since the group’s inception. The policy network that has surrounded
Virginia’s non-tidal wetland program since its establishment appears large, characterized by
diverse weak ties, and permeable.
This network has helped Virginia adopt a sophisticated wetland assessment program. The
Virginia approach incorporates a rapid wetland assessment component as part of a three-pronged
strategy that also involves GIS analysis and intensive field-level verification. The assessment
program has been in development since 2003 and is regionally recognized as scientifically
advanced. However, Virginia’s state agencies have not taken the final step and integrated
assessment into regulatory activities despite an ostensible interest in doing so. Rather, state
bureaucrats and members of the policy network seem stuck in late-adoption but preimplementation phase of tool revisions.
VIMS and state wetland regulators are on their sixth round of revisions of the most
current iteration of the rapid wetland assessment tool (Hershner and Havens 2010). State
bureaucrats have pilot-tested the tool in some parts of the state and have begun introducing the
tool to staff at other wetland regulatory agencies such as EPA. Bureaucrats recently contracted
with Virginia Tech to review permit files against aerial photographs to determine where wetland
impacts have occurred legally and illegally, and then build these data into the wetland
assessment tool such that the tool would help a user evaluate cumulative impacts. Staff members
also are applying for EPA funds to modify the assessment approach so that it can better apply to
linear projects, a revision state staffers say will take three to five years. State staff members say
that the first version of the rapid assessment tool should be ready for regulatory roll-out in two to
three years, but note that they are consciously “taking baby steps” and “moving slowly” to
ensure that they only use relevant, high-quality data and measures.
There are a variety of reasons why regulators in the state may be approaching
implementation so slowly. This pace may not be strictly required by the state of the science or
the tool itself; at least one regional expert noted that by this point, the state should be ready just
to get on with implementation. One compelling argument is that state staff members find doing
so difficult when their large and diverse policy network keeps bringing them interesting and
innovative components that could be added to the tool, allowing them to delay an
implementation process that is bound to be politically and potentially legally tricky. The policy
network has never contracted, and thus members have never closed ranks on the rapid
assessment tool and pushed it forward using the energies of a small, committed, tightly knit
group.
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Figure 9

4.6 West Virginia
The policy network devoted to wetland assessment in West Virginia appears relatively
large, diverse (weak ties), and permeable to ideas and staff. It is also relatively young; the state
only began participating in MAWWG in 2004, the same year it requested its first grant from
EPA to fund the establishment of reference sites that would allow the development of a wetland
assessment tool. State bureaucrats themselves reported that they only began serious work on
wetland assessment approximately four years ago. At that time, the wetland assessment policy
network in the state was still rather small and tight-knit. It consisted mainly of state bureaucrats
who did not necessarily have many connections to non-bureaucrats; a leader of the nationally
recognized Association of State Wetland Managers, for example, reports having had limited
contact with wetland regulators from the state (Christie 2010).
However, in the mid-2000s, bureaucrats at the West Virginia Department of Natural
Resources began working with scientists at West Virginia University to develop a rapid wetland
assessment tool (Anderson 2010). Those scientists then worked with wetland assessment experts
nationwide to craft the tool, selecting from tools used in California, Ohio, Montana, Oregon and
other states the pieces and parts that seem most amenable to West Virginia’s resources
(Anderson 2010, Veselka 2010). This tool “cannibalization” (in the words of one WVU
researcher) expanded the policy network significantly.
Although West Virginia began its wetland assessment initiative later than other states in
the region, one federal expert said that the state’s pace toward adoption and implementation
seems quicker than that of some other states in the region (Poeske 2010). The West Virginia
Rapid Wetland Assessment Procedure was developed and internally quality checked by the end
of 2009 (WVDNR 2009). In 2010, field crews tested the tool on 100 randomly selected sites
statewide, and aim to have tested the tool at 1000 different sites by the end of the summer of
2012 (ERC 2010). Once the tool is finalized, it is the “vision and hope” of policy network
members that it will be used in wetland regulatory permitting (Kordek 2009).
Consistent with theory, the expansion and increased permeability and diversity of the
state’s policy network allowed for tool adoption. Now, members of the policy network are
steering the tool towards implementation. There are some possible signs that the policy network
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is contracting in an implementation-facilitative manner. For example, after drawing on wetland
expertise in other states, West Virginia tool developers turned their attention inward, focusing on
which elements were best suited to West Virginia (Kordek 2010) and thus giving less attention to
their regional and national weak ties. In interviews, state bureaucrats responsible for the wetland
assessment initiative emphasized the importance of getting a collection of key individuals
“onboard” with the idea of regulatory use, including staff members from the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers and at the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection. Core members of
the network thus may recognize that bonding social capital and strong ties with a select, small
group of highly relevant actors facilitates tool implementation; however, it remains to be seen
whether the policy network will achieve this transformation:
Figure 10

5.0 Discussion
The case sketches illustrate the correlations between adoption-implementation and policy
network expansion-contraction cycles theorized at the outset. However, there are some important
considerations this analysis does not address.
First, the composition of the policy networks likely impacts adoption and
implementation, but in this analysis, “critical actors” remain undifferentiated. It may be
consequential whether the policy network is dominated by government actors, for example,
versus university scientists. Also, in Delaware, Ohio, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, there were or
are one or two actors who clearly were linchpins in progress toward or delays in adoption and
implementation. The way these network “stars” (Carrington, Scott, and Wasserman 2005)
influence AI and EC cycles should be more closely examined.
Second, and relatedly, when the policy network expands or contracts, it is likely that
some actors on the periphery of the network take on more central roles, and vice-versa. For
example, in a network facilitative of adoption, scientists who can bring innovative ideas to the
table appear to play a valued role. However, in a network facilitative of implementation,
bureaucrats who can “bulldog” the assessment program through implementation challenges will
be more active and valued (Sumner 2011). Scientists will move to the periphery, perhaps only
consulted when there is a substantive question about the tool. Which actors shift location in the
policy network, and how and when, is an issue that requires more study.
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The third issue is one touched on in Section 2.2: the age of the policy network. A recently
formed policy network may behave differently than a more mature one. The ways in which
networks collect, retain, or shed members and the kinds of bonds that develop among members
may change over time. These dynamics must be explored further.
Fourth, while the ways policy entrepreneurs or larger external forces affect the pace and
trajectory of AI and EC cycles can be observed in hindsight, it remains unclear whether these
propositions are predictive. More data and analysis are necessary to explore this question and to
test the theory beyond the cases from which it was developed.
Finally, this analysis treats the likelihood and extent of adoption and implementation of a
rapid wetland assessment tool as separate from the suitability of the tool for the resource, the
scientific rigor of the tool, the tool’s fit with the standard operating procedures of the bureaucrats
who must implement it, and the relevant socioeconomic or political contexts. These variables
enter the analysis when bureaucrats consider them when contemplating whether and how to
adopt and implement. In reality, though, these are consequential independent variables which
may matter more to practitioners than the network variables, particularly to the extent that these
variables affect resources directly (e.g., if the science behind a tool is flawed, the tool’s
“successful” adoption and implementation, as defined by a policy scholar, may actually harm the
resource). A fundamental challenge of this research is finding a way to evaluate the impact these
variables have on adoption and implementation outcomes relative to, or in combination with, the
network variables.
6.0 Conclusions
The permeability, size, and tie strength of policy networks appears to affect whether and
the pace at which state bureaucracies adopt and implement science policy innovations. Adoption
and implementation are continuous rather than binary variables; they are processes that are
linked cyclically. Networks expand and contract cyclically along the noted policy dimensions. A
correct alignment of adoption-implementation and network expansion-contraction cycles
increases the likelihood that adoption and implementation will occur and progress. Policy
entrepreneurs as well as larger external influences contribute to alignment or misalignment.
These propositions were illustrated by case sketches describing the attempts of six states
in the Mid-Atlantic region of the United States to adopt and implement rapid wetland assessment
tools. The policy outcomes in the case sketches are largely supportive of the propositions.
However, the propositions must address some potentially important variables for which they
currently do not account. The propositions require further development and out-of-sample
testing.
7.0 References
Alan T. Herlihy, Jean Sifneos, Chris Bason, Amy Jacobs, Mary Kentula, and M. Siobhan
Fennessy. 2010. An approach for evaluating the repeatability of rapid assessment
methods: The effects of training and experience. Environmental Management 44 no. 2:
369-377.
American Association for Public Opinion Research. 2011. Standard definitions: Final disposition
of case codes and outcome rates for surveys. Lenexa, KS: AAPOR.
Anderson, Jim. 2010. Interview by Gwen Arnold. Tape recording. November 23.
Balla, Steven J. 2001. Interstate professional associations and the diffusion of policy innovations.
American Politics Research 29 no. 3:221-245.

Arnold

4th Annual Conference on Political Networks

25

Bardach, E. 1977. The Implementation Game: What Happens When a Bill Becomes a Law. MIT
Press: Cambridge, MA.
Bennett, Colin J., and Michael Howlett. 1992. The lessons of learning: Reconciling theories of
policy learning and policy change. Policy Sciences 25 no. 3: 275-294.
Brown, Andrew D. 2006. A narrative approach to collective identities. Journal of Management
Studies 43 no. 4:731-753.
Benson, J. K. 1982. A framework for policy analysis. In Interorganizational Coordination:
Theory, Research, and Implementation, eds. D. L. Rogers et al., 137–201. Ames, Iowa
State University Press.
Biddle, Mark, Amy Jacobs, and Laura Herr. 2009. Integrated wetlands assessment methods into
water quality certification to improve wetland protection in Delaware. Grant application
to EPA Wetland Program Development Grants initiative, WPD: EPA-REG03-EAID-0908.
Borzel, T. A. 1998. Organizing Babylon: On the different conceptions of policy networks. Public
administration 76 no. 2: 253-273.
Burstein, Paul. 1991. Policy domains: Organization, culture, and policy outcomes. Annual
Review of Sociology 17: 327-350.
Burt, R. S. 2001. Structural holes versus network closure as social capital. In Social Capital
Theory and Research, eds. Nan Lin, Karen S. Cook, and Ronald S. Burt, 31-56.
Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
Carolan, Brian V. 2008. The structure of educational research: The role of multivocality in
promoting cohesion in an article interlock network. Social Networks 30 no. 1: 69-82.
Carrigan, Peter, John Scott, and Stanley Wasserman. 2005. Models and Methods in
Social Network Analysis. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Christie, Jeanne. 2010. Interview by Gwen Arnold. October 13.
Christopoulos, Dimitrios C. 2006. Relational attributes of political entrepreneurs: A network
perspective. Journal of European Public Policy 13 no. 5: 757-778.
Clearwater, Denise. 2010. Mid-Atlantic Wetland Workgroup grant status update. Maryland
Department of the Environment Water Management Administration, Wetlands and
Waterways Program. May 3-4.
Coleman, J. S. 1988. Social capital in the creation of human capital. American Journal of
Sociology 94 no. S1: 95.
Crosby, B. L. 1996. Policy implementation: The organizational challenge. World Development
24 no. 9: 1403-1415.
Elster, J. 1986. Rational Choice. New York: New York University Press.
Environmental Law Institute (ELI). 2008. State Wetland Protection Status, Trends, and
Model Approaches. Washington, DC: ELI.
Environmental Research Center (ERC), West Virginia University. 2010. West Virginia
Rapid Assessment Procedure.
http://erc.davis.wvu.edu/projects/research_projects/west_virginia_wetland_rapid_assess
ment_procedure.
Fennessy, M. Siobhan. 2010. Interview by Gwen Arnold. November 18.
Ferejohn, John. 2003. Why study institutions? Paper presented at Crafting and Operating
Institutions, held at Yale University, New Haven, April 11-13.
Gaddie, Ronald Keith, and James L. Regens. 2000. Regulating Wetlands Protection:
Environmental Federalism and the States. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Arnold

4th Annual Conference on Political Networks

26

Gittell, Ross, and Avis Vidal. 1998. Community Organizing: Building Social Capital as a
Development Strategy. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Goldsmith, Stephen, and William D. Eggers. 2004. Governing by Network: The New Shape of
the Public Sector. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
Greenaway, J., B. Salter, and S. Hart. 2007. How policy networks can damage democratic health:
A case study in the government of governance. Public Administration 85 no. 3: 717-738.
Granovetter, Mark S. 1973. The strength of weak ties. The American Journal of Sociology 78 no.
6: 1360-1380.
Hays, Scott P., and Henry R. Glick. 1997. The role of agenda setting in policy innovation.
American Politics Research 25 no. 4: 497-516.
Heichel, Stephan, Jessica Pape, and Thomas Sommerer. 2005. Is there convergence in
convergence research? An overview of empirical studies on policy convergence. Journal
of European Public Policy 12 no. 5: 817-840.
Heider, Fritz. 1958. The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations. New York: Wiley.
Hershner, Carl, and Kirk Havens. 2010. Interview by Gwen Arnold. Tape recording. October 17.
Hanf, Kenneth, and Laurence J. O'Toole. 1992. Revisiting old friends: networks, implementation
structures and the management of inter-organizational relations. European Journal of
Political Research 21 no. 1-2: 163-180.
Janis, IL. 1971. Groupthink: The desperate drive for consensus at any cost. Psychology Today:
344-351.
Kerwin, Cornelius M. 1994. Rulemaking: How Government Agencies Make Law and Write
Policy. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
Kingdon, J. W. 1984. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. Boston, MA: Little, Brown.
Knoke, David, and Song Yang. 2008. Social Network Analysis. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Publications.
Kordek, Walt. 2009. West Virginia wetland condition assessment tools, extant or in-process,
10/2009. Presented at the Mid-Atlantic Wetland Workgroup in May.
Kuhnert, S. 2001. An evolutionary theory of collective action: Schumpeterian entrepreneurship
for the common good. Constitutional Political Economy 12 no. 1:13-29.
Lawton, R. Burns, and Douglas R. Wholey. 1993. Adoption and abandonment of matrix
management programs: Effects of organizational characteristics and inter-organizational
networks. The Academy of Management Journal 36 no. 1:106-138.
Lee, K. N. 1999. Appraising adaptive management. Conservation Ecology 3 no. 2: 3.
Levin, Martin, and Barbara Ferman. 1986. The political hand: Policy implementation and youth
employment programs. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 5 no. 2: 311-325.
McLain, R. J., and R. G. Lee. 1996. Adaptive management: promises and pitfalls. Environmental
Management 20 no. 4: 437-448.
Mack, John. 2010. Interview by Gwen Arnold. Tape recording. October 21.
March, J. G., and J. P. Olsen. 2004. The logic of appropriateness. ARENA working paper WP
04-09. http://www.mendeley.com/research/the-logic-of-appropriateness.
May, Peter J. 1992. Policy learning and failure. Journal of Public Policy 12 no. 4: 331-354.
Meier, Kenneth, J, and John Bohte. 2007. Politics and the Bureaucracy: Policymaking in the
Fourth Branch of Government. Belmont, CA: Thomas Higher Education Press.
Micacchion, Mick. 2010. Interview by Gwen Arnold. Tape recording. November 19.
Mintrom, Michael, and Sandra Vergari. 1998. Policy networks and innovation diffusion: The
case of state education reforms. The Journal of Politics 60 no. 1: 126-148.

Arnold

4th Annual Conference on Political Networks

27

Mintrom, M. 1997. Policy entrepreneurs and the diffusion of innovation. American Journal of
Political Science 41 no. 4:738-770.
Mohr, Lawrence B. 1969. Determinants of innovation in organizations. The American Political
Science Review 63 no. 1:111-126.
Nakamura, Robert T., Thomas W. Church, Jr., and Phillip J. Cooper. 1991. Environmental
dispute resolution and hazardous waste cleanups: A cautionary tale of policy
implementation. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 10 no. 2: 204-221.
O’Leary, Rosemary. 1994. The bureaucratic politics paradox: The case of wetlands legislation in
Nevada. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 4 no. 4: 443-467.
Oliver, T. R., and P. Paul-Shaheen. 1997. Translating ideas into actions: entrepreneurial
leadership in state health care reforms. Journal of Health Politics, Policy & Law 22 no. 3:
721-788.
Olson, M. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Ostrom, Elinor. 2007. A diagnostic approach for going beyond panaceas. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 104 no. 39: 15181-15187.
Ostrom, Elinor. 2005. Understanding institutional diversity. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Pedersen, A. B. 2010. Why David sometimes defeats Goliath: The power of actors in
disprivileged land-use policy networks. Land Use Policy 27 no. 2: 324-331.
Pierson, P. 2000. Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of politics. American
Political Science Review 94 no. 2: 251-267.
Pinto, R. M. 2006. Using social network interventions to improve mentally ill clients’ wellbeing. Clinical Social Work Journal 34 no. 1: 83-100.
Poeske, Regina. 2010. Interview Gwen Arnold. Tape recording. Fall 2010.
Pressman, J. L., and A. Wildavsky. 1973. Implementation. Berkeley: University of California
Press.
Reagans, Ray, and Bill McEvily. 2003. Network structure and knowledge transfer: The effects of
cohesion and range. Administrative Science Quarterly 48 no. 2: 240-267.
Rhodes, Charlie. 2010. Interview by Gwen Arnold. Tape recording. October 20.
Sabatier, P. 1978. The acquisition and utilization of technical information by administrative
agencies. Administrative Science Quarterly 23 no. 3: 396-417.
Sabatier, P. A., and H. C. Jenkins-Smith. 1999. The advocacy coalition framework: An
assessment. Theories of the Policy Process, 1st edition, ed. Paul Sabatier, 118. Boulder,
CO: Westview Press.
Sabatier, Paul A., and Christopher M. Wieble. 2007. The advocacy coalition framework:
innovations and clarifications. In Theories of the Policy Process, 2nd edition, ed. Paul
Sabatier, 156-189. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Shipan, Charles R., and Craig Volden. 2006. Bottom-up federalism: The diffusion of
antismoking policies from U.S. cities to states. American Journal of Political Science 50
no. 4: 825-843.
Sifneos, Jean C., Alan T. Herlihy, Amy D. Jacobs, and Mary Kentula. 2010. Calibration of the
Delaware Rapid Assessment Protocol to a comprehensive measure of wetland condition.
Wetlands 30 no. 6: 1011-1022.
Smith, Tom W. 2009. A revised review of methods to estimate the status of cases with unknown
eligibility. Description report prepared for the Standard Definitions Committee of the
American Association for Public Opinion Research.

Arnold

4th Annual Conference on Political Networks

Sumner, Rich. 2011. Interview by Gwen Arnold. Tape recording. March 23.
Tantivess, Sripen, and Gill Walt. 2008. The role of state and non-state actors in the policy
process: the contribution of policy networks to the scale-up of antiretroviral therapy in
Thailand. Health Policy and Planning 23 no. 5: 328-338.
True, Jacqui, and Michael Mintrom. 2001. Transnational networks and policy diffusion:
The case of gender mainstreaming. International Studies Quarterly 45 no. 1: 27-57
van Waarden, Frans. 1992. Dimensions and types of policy networks. European Journal
of Political Research 21 no. 1-2: 29-52.
Young, G. J., M. P. Charns, and S.M. Shortell. 2001. Top manager and network effects
on the adoption of innovative management practices: A study of TQM in a public
hospital system. Strategic Management Journal 22 no. 10: 935-951.
Van Maanen, J. E., and E. H. Schein. 1977. Toward a theory of organizational
socialization. http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/1934/SWP-096003581864.pdf?sequence=1.
Veselka, Walter. 2010. Interview by Gwen Arnold. Tape recording. November 15.
Walker, Jack L. 1969. The diffusion of innovations among the American states. The
American Political Science Review 63 no. 3: 880-899.
Wardrop, Denise. 2010. Interview by Gwen Arnold. Tape recording. November 5.
Weimer, David L., and Aidan R. Vining. 2005. Policy Analysis Concepts and Practice.
4th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall.
West Virginia DNR (WVDNR). 2009. West Virginia wetland program development
assistance. Report submitted to EPA Region 3.

28

